Early in Fielding’s The
Governess, the pupils of Mrs. Teachum’s academy are reformed by an
experience in which they physically fight over an apple, feel and inflict pain, and later reflect seriously on the motivations for and consequences of their actions. This, their first of many lessons, soon finds the girls, when dining together, “so changed, that each helped her next Neighbour before she would touch
any for herself” (59). I was surprised,
then, to encounter, just a few pages later, what seemed a very different
sentiment regarding one’s fellow person.
When, out on a walk, the class comes upon “a miserable ragged Fellow,
who begged their charity,” they move instinctively to provide him aid, which prompts the following from their governess: “She told them, she approved of their
Readiness to assist the poor Fellow, as he appeared to them: But oftentimes
those Fellows made up dismal Stories without much Foundation, and because they
were lazy, and would not work” (109).
That Mrs. Teachum would advocate caution, even mistrust, when
interacting with the seemingly needy seemed incongruous with what I had thus
far read. Further reflection recalled, however, a story shared by Miss Jenny Pearce earlier in the novel, by which I began to form a clearer picture of that which Fielding is here promoting. Jenny tells of a time in her youth in which she was much grieved by the loss of a beloved pet. When Jenny's mother believes
her daughter to have spent sufficient time mourning her loss, she advises her daughter thus: “Now tho’ I have always
encouraged you in all Sentiments of Good-nature and Compassion . . . you are to
consider, my Child, that you are not to give way to any Passions that interfere
with your Duty" (65).
The narrator soon
offers several striking exemplifications of the validity of Mrs. Peace
and Mrs. Teachum’s calls for caution. In the fairy tale concerning Princess Hebe, the queen
warns her daughter against “the Indulgence of the most Laudable Passion,
even Benevolence and Compassion itself, through the tale of a “Hen, who,
thinking that she heard the Voice of a little Duckling in Distress, flew from
her Young ones, to go and give it Assistance” (129). In consequence of committing this charitable
act, the helpful hen is eaten by a fox, and her offspring by a falcon. Yikes.
Soon after, Mrs. Teachum’s students are told, by Miss Jenny, of
Princess Hebe’s being tricked into estrangement from her mother by her impulse
to rescue a shepherdess from the clutches of the deceitful Rozella and of the fairy Sybella’s having been
similarly hoodwinked in her efforts to aid what seems an old man interested in
the reformation of his wayward son (135; 137).
These grave lessons could clearly be perceived as suggesting that
charitable action leads to disaster.
However, as so many didactic voices throughout the novel explicitly commend
benevolence, there is obviously something more at work here.
This may simply amount to one aspect of Fielding’s
larger admonition against acting with “Passion.” In the aforementioned examples in which
charitable action has dire consequences, it is important to note that each
hinges on a spontaneous reaction, that of leaping to the aid of one in need, to
a spontaneous emotion, that of compassion.
Happily, there are many examples in the novel in which concern with the
well-being of others does not lead to oppression or death. The students’ selfless interaction with one another following the “apple fray” is, of course, one important example, as the
girls are only equal to such magnanimity after careful reflection upon their own
and the others’ behavior. Fielding posits reason, then, rather than passion, as the proper impetus for action.
Because I, in my reading of The Governess, thought its views on charity
strikingly pronounced, I wondered what other philosophy may have informed these
views. Having read, in the text’s introduction,
that Fielding was influenced by Locke’s theories on education, I was interested
in Locke’s views on benevolence, and I found Steven Forde’s “The Charitable John
Locke” to be helpful (29). It
would be very difficult to paraphrase Forde’s treatment of the complex nature
of Locke’s views on charity, but the following excerpt from his essay, though seemingly
not wholly related to that which I am concerned with here, is instructive:
“In both [his “Venditio”]
and the passage on charity in the First Treatise, Locke is very precise in his
language: though charity is a duty it is not a duty of ‘justice.’ Justice, in matters of property, is concerned
only with respecting the possessions of others and with fair rules of trade, a
standard relatively easily reconciled with self-interest. Charity is a more
exacting moral standard, but one to which people cannot strictly be held . . .
[M] men are duty-bound only to refrain from harming or destroying one another.”
(451)
Forde also asserts, ultimately, that “Lockean morality
is not individual right per se, but concern for the common good.” (1). If
I, in my admittedly very limited study of this aspect of Lockean theory, am
correct in believing it to suggest that, because a natural right to self-preservation
logically engenders self-interest, mediating one’s compassionate impulses
through one’s self-interest is ethical, then these views seem to relate to
those espoused by Fielding in The
Governess. For Mrs. Teachum and the
novel’s other educators, self-preservation amounts, of course, to the
preservation of one’s moral character, or the strict adherence to one’s “Duty.” I would be interested in learning of the extent to
which Fielding, like Locke, conceived of such preservation as ultimately beneficial
to both the individual and society.
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